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1.1 Context: US non-ratification of the LOSC 
 
 The United States remains the most conspicuous non-party to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter the LOSC or the Convention), despite every 
presidential administration supporting ratification of the treaty since its entry into force in 1994. 
US objections to the Convention originally materialized under the Reagan Administration – 
after nearly a decade of productive international negotiations – and were directed at the regime 
for the deep seabed under Part XI.  These concerns were subsequently addressed in the 1994 
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI, and accession to the treaty has since 
enjoyed broad, bipartisan support in the US.  Nevertheless, opposition persists among a 
minority of conservative Senators who see the Convention as undermining American 
sovereignty.  The US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has recommended accession to 
the treaty on several occasions, but a small group of Senators has repeatedly succeeded in 
obstructing a full vote which is needed for the Senate to give its advice and consent for 
ratification.
1
  Their cause has been aided, it seems, by the perception among some lawmakers 
that accession is not an urgent priority – for decades now the US has been acting consistently 
with the Convention on the basis of customary international law.
2
 
 In contrast to this view, advocates of accession assert that ratifying the LOSC is 
imperative for the US to safeguard its maritime rights and interests by putting them on a more 
secure legal footing.  In particular, rights to the continental shelf are often singled out as an area 
where the US would gain legal certainty by ratifying the Convention.
3
  The LOSC recognizes 
the continental shelf rights of a coastal state extending throughout the natural prolongation of 
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, which consists of the geophysical 
continental shelf, the continental slope, and the continental rise (see Figure 1).   
                                                          
1
 Mattler (2005), “The Law of the Sea Convention: A View from the US Senate”, pp. 33-34. 
2
 Caron and Scheiber (2007), “The United States and the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty”. Retrieved from 
<http://www.asil.org/insights>. 
3
 E.g. Negroponte (2012), Statement Before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee; US National Security 





In some areas, the continental margin extends far beyond the 200 nautical mile (nm) exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) which is claimed by the US on the basis of customary law.  The rules for 
delineating this entitlement are complex, and entail a procedural obligation for states parties to 
submit scientific data on continental shelf limits beyond 200 nm to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereinafter CLCS or the Commission) – an independent body 
of technical specialists established under the Convention.  It is frequently held that the US, as a 
non-party to the Convention, does not have access to the CLCS procedure as a means of 
substantiating the extent of its continental shelf entitlement.
4
  The CLCS submissions of other 
states occasionally make headlines (see the recent submission by Russia concerning the Arctic), 
stoking fears that the US is “losing out” – presumably on rights in continental shelf areas to 
which it otherwise would be entitled as a party to the Convention.
5
  While this narrative has the 
worthy political objective of encouraging US accession, it is easily criticized from a legal 
standpoint.  Namely, it misrepresents CLCS submissions as “claims” in a legal sense, and fails 
to acknowledge that the US enjoys continental shelf rights under customary international law 
which are inherent – they do not depend on any express proclamation.
6
  In the event an 
                                                          
4
 E.g. Oude Elferink (2013), “The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf in the Polar Regions”, p. 63; Negroponte 
(2012); ILA Committee on Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf (2006), 2
nd
 Report, Conclusion No. 16. 
5
 E.g. Bamford, “Frozen Assets” in Foreign Policy (May 11 2015): “Even if the Senate were to ratify the treaty, it is 
likely that, by the time it submits its claim to the commission, much of the icy region will be accounted for”; 
“Twenty-Five Years and Counting”, editorial in New York Times (31 October 2007): “Unless the United States 
ratifies the treaty, it will not have a seat at the table when it comes time to sort out competing claims”. 
6
 LOSC Article 77(3). 
Figure 1 – A basic illustration of the components of the continental margin 
Source: Buzan and Middlemiss (1977), “Canadian Foreign Policy and the Exploitation of the Seabed”, p. 2. 
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overlapping entitlement is found with an opposite or adjacent coastal state, international law 
requires delimitation by agreement.
7
 
In any case, it is clear that the best way for the US to ensure its continental shelf rights 
under international law is to ratify the Convention.  Many informed commentators in the US, 
including representatives from government, industry, and the military, support accession to the 
treaty.
8
  US accession would also have the effect of adding an important endorsement to what 
has already become a near-universal legal regime.  Until this happens, however, international 
maritime affairs will proceed without the US as a party to the Convention.  US status as a 
significant maritime nation does not need emphasis, but what is relevant to the present study is 
that the US is a coastal state with broad continental margins.  Preliminary studies indicate that 
the US continental margin beyond 200 nm totals over one million square kilometers – an area 
twice the size of California.
9
  This represents a massive swath of seabed – potentially 
containing valuable resources – the entitlement to which is rendered ambiguous by US non-
accession to the LOSC.  The US has been gathering data on its continental shelf since 2001, 
with a view to defining its outer limits.
10
  It cannot be expected that these legal questions will 
lie dormant indefinitely.  This study proposes an investigation of the international legal regime 
for the continental shelf, including its status vis-à-vis LOSC non-parties as customary law, in 
order to achieve a clearer picture of the specific rights and obligations which characterize US 
entitlement to a continental shelf. 
1.2 Objective of thesis 
 
The objective of this thesis is to answer the following question: what are the 
implications of US non-accession to the LOSC for its entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 
200 nm?  There is no doubt as to whether the US enjoys certain rights over its continental shelf 
as a matter of customary international law; the more complicated question is to what degree 
these customary rights correspond with the legal framework set out in Part VI of the 
                                                          
7
 LOSC Article 83; 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf Article 6. 
8
 See e.g. US Department of State, “Supporters”, retrieved from 
<http://www.state.gov/e/oes/lawofthesea/statements/index.htm/>.  
9
 US ECS Project, “About the Extended Continental Shelf Project”, retrieved from 
<http://continentalshelf.gov/about.html>. 
10




Convention.  The issue of the seaward extent of such rights is particularly interesting.  The 
Convention’s rules on this subject are complex, reflecting a carefully negotiated compromise 
on outer limits.  In this respect, there are aspects of the LOSC legal regime which were never 
part of the traditional concept of the continental shelf.  Today, it is not immediately clear which 
of these rules are applicable to the US as a non-party. 
While treaty rights and obligations are in principle binding only upon states which 
consent to be bound to them, they may nevertheless come to reflect rules of customary 
international law.  The LOSC continental shelf regime codified certain rules which already 
reflected international custom at the time of its drafting, as well as introduced new legal rules, 
some of which have arguably acquired a customary character through subsequent state practice.  
Part of the task inherent in this research question thus involves disaggregating and analyzing 
the component parts of the LOSC continental shelf regime in light of state practice, so as to 
identify those rules of a customary character which are applicable to LOSC parties and non-
parties alike.  This gives rise to several core research questions, which will be examined in 
subsequent chapters: 
 Is the US entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm under customary international law? 
 What is the legal relationship between entitlement to a continental shelf and establishment of its 
outer limits? 
 Can the US submit information on its outer limits to the CLCS? 
 What is the legal character of outer limits established outside of the CLCS procedure? 
1.3 Legal sources and methodology 
 
This study is concerned primarily with legal research.  Various sources of international 
law, as reflected by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), will be 
considered.  As described above, the central research task involves identifying legal rules 
which can be said to apply to a state which has not ratified the primary source of conventional 
law on the subject.  As such, reference to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(hereinafter VCLT) will be indispensable.  A fundamental rule of international treaty law, 
pacta tertiis, says that treaties are only binding upon states which consent to be bound by them.  
This is stated in VCLT Article 34: “A treaty does not create either rights or obligations for third 
states without their consent”.  While this is the general rule, the VCLT further provides that 
5 
 
treaties can create rights or obligations for a third state (the term in treaty law for states not 
party to a treaty) if the parties to the treaty intended for such rights or obligations to apply to 
third states and the third state assents thereto.
11
  None of these rules prevent, however, a rule set 




Customary rules can emerge from state practice in the presence of opinio juris.  Article 
38 of the Statute of the ICJ refers to “international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law.”  This phrasing suggests the presence of two elements: a body of state practice 
(objective element), and evidence that this practice arises from a feeling of legal obligation 
(opinio juris – subjective element).
13  While opinio juris in some cases can be difficult to 
ascertain, state practice can be understood in relatively simple terms as what states do and 
say.
14
  On the transmigration of a rule from conventional to customary law, the ICJ has stated: 
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the 
formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a 
purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in 
question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are 
specifically affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the 
provision invoked – and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general 
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.
15
 
This appears to set a fairly high threshold for the formation of a customary rule.  Nevertheless, 
it has been suggested that the ICJ has, at times, found customary rules without applying the two 
criteria identified above, having referred in its jurisprudence to norms for ensuring coexistence 
and vital cooperation among members of the international community, moral imperatives, 




It is not possible, within the limited space of this thesis, to analyze state practice in 
sufficient detail to determine customary international law in every instance.  Ascertaining the 
contents of customary law is part of the work of international courts and tribunals, which are 
                                                          
11
 VCLT (1969), Articles 35 and 36. 
12
 VCLT (1969), Article 38. 
13




 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ (1969), para. 74. 
16
 Treves (2006), “Customary International Law”. 
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both qualified and equipped for this task.  International judicial decisions, where they are 
relevant to the questions at hand, will therefore be an important resource in gauging the status 
of customary international law.  The analysis of individual treaty provisions and terms, which is 
necessary to the object of this thesis, will be done in accordance with the VCLT’s rules on the 
interpretation of treaties.  The general rule of treaty interpretation is contained in Article 31 of 
the VCLT, and states that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose”.  In certain circumstances, the preparatory work of a treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion may be referenced as supplementary means of interpretation.
17
 
1.4 Structure of thesis 
 
 This thesis will proceed in five subsequent chapters.  The next chapter traces the early 
development of the continental shelf as a legal concept, beginning with its genesis in the 1945 
Truman Proclamation and leading up to its codification in the 1982 LOSC.  A brief overview of 
the legal history associated with the continental shelf is prerequisite to a discussion of 
customary international law on the subject.  Chapter 3 analyzes customary international law as 
it applies to the continental shelf.  As a starting point for this analysis, it discusses the package 
deal character of the Convention and reviews US policy and practice with respect to the 
continental shelf.  The chapter proceeds by distinguishing three distinct elements of the 
continental shelf regime which emerged from the LOSC: substantive rights of the coastal state, 
the basis of continental shelf entitlement, and the delineation of outer limits beyond 200 nm.  
The potential customary status of these elements is considered in light of the legal history 
described in chapter 2, as well as relevant state practice and post-1982 judicial decisions.  
Chapter 4 discusses the LOSC rules for establishing outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nm, including the role of the CLCS.  Specifically, the competence of the CLCS is analyzed 
vis-à-vis the competence of coastal states in the process of establishing outer limits.  This 
chapter further considers the legal status of outer limits (a) established “on the basis” of the 
Commission’s recommendations and (b) potentially established outside of the CLCS 
procedure.  Chapter 5 raises the question of whether a state which is not party to the 
Convention, such as the US, has the right to make a submission to the CLCS.  The question is 
                                                          
17
 VCLT (1969), Article 32. 
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not simple, and various arguments are possible.  This chapter identifies and discusses the 
principal arguments in connection with this question.  Chapter 6, as the concluding chapter, 
attempts to synthesize the findings of this research with respect to the position of the United 


























2 Development of the legal continental shelf 
2.1 1945-1982: Truman Proclamation to UNCLOS III 
 
In order to analyze the current legal regime for the continental shelf, it is first necessary 
to understand where it came from.  The international legal concept of the continental shelf has 
its origins in the 1945 Truman Proclamation, through which the US Government claimed 
jurisdiction and control over the natural resources in the seabed and subsoil contiguous to its 
coasts.  This appropriation was justified, inter alia, on the basis that “the continental shelf may 
be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally 
appurtenant to it”.
18
  This did not go unnoticed by the international community – the Truman 
Proclamation was followed by similar claims from many other states.
19
  As an outcome of the 
First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958, a definition of the legal 
continental shelf was codified for the first time in the Convention on the Continental Shelf 





 sovereign rights over the continental shelf, defined as “the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas”.
22
  Although different interpretations of 
this provision are possible, it was acknowledged already at the 1958 conference that the 




 In 1969, the ICJ made a landmark judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
(hereinafter North Sea) cases which had important implications for the future of the continental 
shelf regime.  The Court was requested to identify the principles and rules of international law 
for the delimitation of the continental shelf, as applicable between the parties to the cases 
                                                          
18
 US Proclamation No. 2667 (1945), Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the 
Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf.  Retrieved from 
<www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_proc_2667.pdf>.  
19
 Churchill and Lowe (1999), The Law of the Sea, p. 144. 
20
 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Article 2(3). 
21
 Ibid, Article 2(2). 
22
 Ibid, Article 1. 
23
 Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 147. 
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(Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands).  Because only two of the three parties had ratified 
the 1958 Convention, the Court needed to consider the customary status of several of that 
convention’s provisions.  In its judgment, the Court confirmed the customary character of the 
substantive continental shelf regime set out in Articles 1 through 3 in the 1958 Convention, but 
also elaborated upon the underlying basis of entitlement to the continental shelf.  In a well-
known dictum, the Court stated: 
the rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of the continental shelf that constitutes a 
natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist, ipso facto and ab initio, 
by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources.
24
   
In other words, it is “the extension of something already possessed” (sovereign territory) which 
confers title to the continental shelf.
25
  Accordingly, the notion of natural prolongation 
recognized that the legal institution of the continental shelf arose from a “physical fact”.
26
 
What the North Sea judgment did not address, as it was concerned with the delimitation 
of the continental shelf between neighboring states, was the delineation of outer limits as a 
unilateral act of the coastal state.  The issue of outer limits did not arise in the geographical 
context of the North Sea.  This question was still governed by Article 1 of the 1958 
Convention.  The “exploitability criterion” contained in this article was widely recognized as 
inadequate, particularly given the rapid development of technology allowing for the 
exploitation of seabed resources at greater depths.
27
   This sentiment reached its peak in the late 
1960’s, when it was considered that the mining of mineral resources on the deep seabed could 
become commercially possible in the near future.  Recognizing that the benefits of these 
activities would accrue primarily to industrial states with the requisite technological capacity, 
developing states advanced the idea that the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction should be 
protected from encroachment and appropriation by states, and that its resources are “the 
common heritage of mankind”.
28
  This legal concept was developed further in a 1970 United 
Nations General Assembly resolution, which called for the formal establishment of a legal 
                                                          
24
 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ (1969), para. 19. 
25
 Ibid, para. 43. 
26
 Ibid, para. 95. 
27
 See UNGA Resolution 2574 A (XXIV) of 15 December 1969. 
28




regime and institutional machinery for the management of the international seabed area.
29
  
Thus, a key mandate for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1974-82, 
hereinafter UNCLOS III) was the need to clearly delineate the limits of national jurisdiction, 
expressed as the outer limits of the continental shelf, so as to define the international seabed 
area and give effect to the common heritage of mankind principle.
30
 
2.2 The LOSC and Article 76 
 
A new continental shelf regime would represent a compromise, as it needed to 
accommodate different views espoused by several blocs of states.  A large group representing 
mostly landlocked or geographically disadvantaged states advocated for the continental shelf 
regime to be absorbed within the new EEZ regime, and therefore limited to 200 nm from the 
baselines.  This perspective was motivated by a concern that extensive continental shelf 
entitlements would unreasonably diminish the size of the international seabed area.
31
  
Meanwhile, a relatively small number of states with broad continental margins argued for a 
definition of the continental shelf which would extend throughout the natural prolongation of 
their land territory, to the edge of the continental margin.  These states were unwilling to accept 
a 200 nm limit to their continental shelf rights, as they felt that they had already acquired rights 
under international law beyond this distance.  Their negotiating position drew on Article 1 of 
the 1958 Convention, the language and reasoning of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases, and some state practice in the issuance of oil and gas permits on the continental margin.
32
   
A basic definition of the continental shelf was put forth relatively early, in the third of 
eleven conference sessions, and later repeated verbatim as Article 76(1) of the LOSC: 
The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land 
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles 
                                                          
29
 UNGA Resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970. 
30
 See UNGA Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of 17 December 1970.  The preparatory body for the conference itself grew 
out of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction (the Seabed Committee). 
31
 Nordquist et al. (1993), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 2 
(hereinafter Virginia Commentary), pp. 844-45. 
32
 See observation of Canada at the 46
th
 plenary meeting, referenced in Virginia Commentary (1993), 846. 
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from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer 
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
33
    
The new definition featured a combination of a distance criterion (a legal continental shelf of 
200 nm regardless of the physical characteristics of the seabed), as well as a geomorphological 
criterion (to the outer edge of the continental margin) to satisfy the broad-margin states.  The 
continental margin is defined in Article 76(3) as consisting of the continental shelf, the slope, 
and the rise, but not the deep ocean floor or oceanic ridges.
34
  Because the new definition was 
intended above all to close the door on the elastic nature of the 1958 Convention’s 
exploitability criterion, it became essential to precisely define the outer edge of the continental 
margin and prescribe rules for its delineation beyond 200 nm.  The negotiations on this matter 
produced a compromise entailing three major parts.  The first was a complex formula for 
delineating the outer edge of the continental margin beyond 200 nm, consisting of technical 
criteria, set out in paragraphs 4 to 6 of Article 76.  Secondly, an independent body, the CLCS, 
was established to assist states in applying the Article 76 formula.  The third element of the 
compromise entails revenue-sharing obligations which are applicable to the exploitation of 
non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  These obligations are defined in 
Article 82. 
2.2.1 Article 76 formula  
 
The general definition of the continental shelf is immediately qualified by Article 76(2), 
which indicates that it shall not extend beyond the limits provided in paragraphs 4 to 6 of 
Article 76.  Paragraphs 4 to 6 of Article 76 define the technical criteria for coastal states to 
delineate the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  These criteria have been 
discussed at length elsewhere
35
 and are summarized only briefly here.  Outer limits may be 
drawn on the basis of two possible formula lines, both of which are based on the location of the 
foot of the continental slope.
36
  The first formula is a function of the thickness of sedimentary 
rocks (greater thickness enables more seaward limits), while the second formula is a distance 
                                                          
33
 Article 62 of the Informal Single Negotiating Text/Part II, reproduced in Virginia Commentary (1993), p. 851. 
34
 LOSC Article 76(3). 
35
 See e.g. Smith and Taft (2000), “Legal Aspects of the Continental Shelf”. 
36
 LOSC Article 76(4)(b) states “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall 
be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base.” 
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not exceeding 60 nm from the foot of the slope.
37
  Final limits are subject to two possible 
constraints, as they may not exceed either 350 nm from the baselines, or 100 nm from the 2,500 
meter isobath which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters.
38
  A coastal state is free to 
apply a combination of the two formula lines and two constraints, so as to maximize the extent 
of their continental margin.  There is an exception for submarine ridges, however, which are 
limited to the former constraint of 350 nm from the baselines.
39
   
It should be noted that the above criteria are not easily applicable in all situations.  
There are significant ambiguities, for example, associated with the interpretation of Article 76 
rules on the location of the foot of the slope, calculations of sediment thickness, the selection of 
the 2,500 meter isobaths, and classification of ridges.
40
  While a legal analysis of these issues is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, they illustrate in a general sense the complexity associated with 
implementation of the Article 76 formula.  This complexity is the product of extensive 
negotiations on an issue which carried important resource implications, and moreover was 
central to the conference mandate of defining the international seabed area.  In light of these 
factors, it is perhaps understandable that the international community considered it desirable to 
establish an independent body to facilitate the practical application of the Article 76 formula. 
2.2.2 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
 
During the third session, the US proposed that continental shelf delineations be 
submitted to a Continental Shelf Boundary Commission, whose acceptance of the data would 
render the outer limits final and binding.
41
  This body was ultimately established under Annex 
II to the Convention as the CLCS.  The CLCS is charged with carrying out two main functions.  
According to Article 3 of Annex II to the Convention, the functions of the Commission shall 
be: 
a) to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning the outer limits 
of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to 
                                                          
37
 LOSC Article 76(4)(a). 
38
 LOSC Article 76(5). 
39
 LOSC Article 76(6).  Submarine ridges are distinguished from “submarine elevations which are natural 
components of the continental margin”. 
40
 Nelson (2002), “The Continental Shelf: Interplay of Law and Science”, p. 1242.  See also ILA Committee on Legal 
Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf (2002), Preliminary Report, p. 4. 
41
 Virginia Commentary (1993), p. 849. 
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make recommendations in accordance with article 76 and the Statement of Understanding 
adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; 
b) to provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned during 
the preparation of the data referred to in subparagraph (a). 
Pursuant to Article 76(8), coastal states have a procedural obligation to submit information on 
the limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 nm to the CLCS.  The significance of CLCS 
recommendations is reflected in the last sentence of this article, which provides that continental 
shelf limits “established by the coastal state on the basis of these recommendations shall be 
final and binding.”  The US Government has described the CLCS as a “mechanism to prevent 
or reduce the potential for dispute and uncertainty over the precise limits of the continental 
shelf where the continental margin extends beyond 200 miles”, through a process which is not 
adversarial, but which provides certain “safeguards against exaggerated claims”.
42
  The role of 
the Commission is considered in greater depth in chapter 4. 
2.2.3 Article 82 revenue-sharing obligations 
 
At the UNCLOS III negotiations, developing and geographically disadvantaged states 
resisted the recognition of continental shelf rights extending to the outer edge of the continental 
margin on the basis that this would unreasonably impinge upon the international seabed area 
and the common heritage of mankind.  During the second session of the conference, US 
negotiators proposed a revenue-sharing scheme as “a way to reconcile the positions of States 
which maintained that their rights extended to the edge of the continental margin beyond 200 
miles and those that did not wish to see the common heritage of mankind diminished by 
recognizing coastal State jurisdiction beyond 200 miles”.
43
  In its final form in Article 82, this 
obligation applies with respect to the exploitation of non-living resources of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines.  Sharing of revenues shall take the form of 
payments or contributions in kind, beginning at 1 percent of the value during the 6
th
 year of 
production and increasing at 1 percent per year, but not to exceed the rate of 7 percent reached 
in the 12
th
 year of production.
44
  Developing states which are net importers of the exploited 
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resource may be exempt from these requirements.
45
 Payments are made to and distributed 
through the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which is the body established under the 
LOSC to act on the behalf of mankind with respect to activities carried out in the international 
seabed area (hereinafter the Area).  It should be noted that Article 82 is a dormant provision, in 
the sense that it has not been applied in practice to date.  Its implementation is currently under 
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3 The LOSC continental shelf regime as customary international law 
 
True to the Convention’s preamble, Part VI of the LOSC resembles both codification 
and progressive development of the law of the sea as it applies to the continental shelf.  Several 
substantive aspects of the LOSC continental shelf regime, for example, were repeated 
unchanged from the 1958 Convention.  These include the nature of a coastal state’s sovereign 
rights over the continental shelf, which are exclusive, inherent, and do not affect the legal status 
of superjacent waters and airspace.
47
  In these respects, the LOSC merely codified a pre-
existing legal framework.  Other aspects of the LOSC regime were clearly without precedent, 
however, especially with regard to outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  The 
Article 76 formula for locating the outer edge of the continental margin, the procedural role of 
the CLCS in the establishment of outer limits, and the revenue-sharing requirements under 
Article 82 all emerged as distinctly new aspects of the continental shelf regime.  These 
provisions were the product of extensive negotiations, embodying a compromise that was 
finally accepted as a package deal. 
3.1 Implications of the package deal 
 
The object of this chapter is to discern the principal elements of the LOSC continental 
shelf regime, with a view to discussing their potential applicability vis-à-vis non-parties to the 
Convention through the operation of customary international law.  This warrants reflection, in 
the first place, on the package deal character of the Convention.  The fashion in which the 
Convention was negotiated, and eventually adopted, may have implications for its ability to 
contribute to the formation of customary rules of law.  In short, the Convention was agreed to 
as an indivisible whole – every state made concessions on individual provisions in order to 
reach a general consensus on the integral text.  As such, it is difficult to gauge the consensus 
which would have existed around any individual provision or rule, taken by itself, as each was 
ultimately weighed as a constituent part of a delicately-balanced compromise.
48
  Moreover, no 
reservations were permitted.  The US delegation expressed the view that “since the Convention 
is an overall ‘package deal’ reflecting different priorities of different States, to permit 
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reservations would inevitably permit one State to eliminate the ‘quid’ of another State’s 
‘quo’.”
49
  Similarly, the package deal arguably complicates the transformation of individual 
LOSC provisions into rules of customary international law.
50
 
Nevertheless, the legal effect of the package deal has its limitations.  Caminos and 
Molitor note that “the package deal could not have crystallized all of the provisions of the 
Convention into an indivisible whole before the treaty was adopted” in 1982.
51
  It therefore did 
not affect the customary status of provisions appearing in the Convention which had already 
been recognized as rules of customary international law, such as those provisions which were 
carried over unmodified from the 1958 Convention.  The same consideration may apply to the 
Convention’s more innovative provisions, if they came to reflect customary law during the 
course of UNCLOS III negotiations and prior to the treaty’s adoption.
52
  In the judgment for the 
1982 Tunisia/Libya case which was decided several months before the Convention was 
adopted, the ICJ explained that “it could not ignore any provision of the draft convention if it 
came to the conclusion that the content of such provision is binding upon all members of the 
international community because it embodies or crystallizes a pre-existing or emergent rule of 
customary law”.
53
   
The other category of provisions – those which had not yet achieved customary status at 
the time of the Convention’s adoption – must be considered as being more closely linked to the 
entire Convention package.
54
  Nevertheless, international case law would suggest that these 
provisions are not necessarily precluded from transforming into customary rules.  The ICJ 
made an interesting pronouncement in the 1984 Gulf of Maine judgment: 
Turning lastly to the proceedings of [UNCLOS III] and the final result of that Conference, the 
Chamber notes in the first place that the Convention adopted at the end of the Conference has 
not yet come into force and that a number of States do not appear inclined to ratify it.  This, 
however, in no way detracts from the consensus reached on large portions of the instrument 
and, above all, cannot invalidate the observation that certain provisions of the Convention 
concerning the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone […] were adopted, without 
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any objections […] these provisions, even if in some respects they bear the mark of the 
compromise surrounding their adoption, may nevertheless be regarded as consonant at present 
with general international law on the question.
55
 
Caminos and Molitor argue that the process of third states acquiring customary rights from the 
Convention “represents a two-edged sword in that it may make equally applicable to third 
states the innovative obligations in the Convention”.
56
  It is recalled that widespread state 
practice, in the presence of opinio juris, is generally required to indicate the emergence of a 
customary rule.  These requirements have not been altered by the package deal.  What this 
suggests, however, is that states wishing to keep the package deal intact may potentially resist 
the formation of customary rules of law derived from the Convention’s provisions.  The 
package deal itself can be characterized as a political understanding, but it may produce legal 
effects indirectly through its influence on state practice.   
3.2 US practice and statements of policy with respect to the continental shelf 
 
The most interesting state practice, for the purposes of this study, is that of the United 
States.  This section reviews the practice and stated policies of the US Government as they 
relate to the continental shelf.  Following the conclusion of the UNCLOS III conference, the 
first clear statement of US oceans policy came in the form of President Reagan’s 1983 
proclamation of a 200 nm EEZ.  A fact sheet accompanying this proclamation indicated that 
“the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance with international law as 
reflected in the results of the Law of the Sea Convention that relate to traditional uses of the 
oceans, such as navigation and overflight”.
57
  While it is sometimes held that the US recognizes 
all LOSC provisions outside of Part XI as customary international law,
58
 this view does not 
seem to be explicitly supported by an official statement of US policy.  It should be noted that 
continental shelf rights are included within the EEZ regime up to 200 nm,
59
 which is applied by 
the US as a part of customary international law.  With respect to sovereign rights to resources 
of the continental shelf, then, legal ambiguity arising from US non-ratification of the LOSC 
concerns primarily the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. 
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 Official US policy for the continental shelf, articulated in a 1987 statement of the 
Interagency Group on the Law of the Sea and Ocean Policy
60
 (see Annex 1), is nuanced in its 
engagement with the provisions of Article 76.  This statement provides that Article 76 reflects 
the proper definition of the continental shelf under international law, and that the US exercises 
“jurisdiction over its continental shelf in accordance with and to the full extent permitted by 
international law as reflected in Article 76, paragraphs (1), (2) and (3).”  At such time in the 
future that the US decides to establish outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, the 
statement provides that this “shall be carried out in accordance with paragraphs (4), (5), (6) and 
(7)”. 
Based on this statement of policy, it can be inferred that the US views the general 
definition of the continental shelf, as it appears in 76(1), as reflecting customary law.  Article 
76(3) is integral to this definition, as it affirms that the continental margin consists of the shelf, 
the slope and the rise.  Additionally, Article 76(2) stipulates that the continental shelf of a 
coastal state shall not extend beyond the limits provided for in paragraphs 4 to 6.  Article 76(4) 
in turn refers to 76(7) on the method of delineation involving fixed points connected by straight 
lines not exceeding 60M in length.  The statement indicates that the US will apply these latter 
four paragraphs as a matter of procedure, without commenting explicitly on whether they are 
perceived as customary law.  Because the statement refers to 76(2) as reflecting international 
law, though, adherence to paragraphs 4 to 6 (and by extension paragraph 7) does seem to arise 
out of a sense of legal obligation.  The statement eschews reference to 76(8) and the CLCS 
procedure, and does not indicate whether the US considers itself bound to Article 82 revenue-
sharing obligations.   
The most interesting example of US practice in relation to these provisions concerns the 
continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico.  The US currently exercises jurisdiction in part of the 
Western Gap area of the Gulf of Mexico, an area slightly smaller than the state of New Jersey, 
which is located beyond its 200 nm EEZ.
61
  This area of the Gulf of Mexico was delimited in a 
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bilateral agreement between the US and Mexico, signed in 2000.  The Delimitation Treaty
62
 
was premised on an agreement between both states that the seabed in this area fulfilled the 
criteria in both the 1958 Convention and Article 76 of the LOSC to be considered as part of the 
legal continental shelf.
63
  Specifically, a desk-top study commissioned by the US Government 
indicates that the presumption of US entitlement in this area relies on the sedimentary thickness 
criterion contained in LOSC Article 76(4)(i).
64
  This is an ultra-deepwater region which 
evidently does not pertain to the continental shelf in a geophysical sense. US oil and gas lease 
stipulations for this area provide for the possibility of implementing Article 82 revenue-sharing 




3.3 Substantive continental shelf rights 
 
With regard to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, McDorman identifies the 
substantive rights enjoyed by a coastal state as a distinct component of the international legal 
framework.
66
  The principal substantive rights resemble constant features of the continental 
shelf regime through its development, as they are derived from the 1958 Convention and 
repeated in the LOSC.  This includes the nature of a coastal state’s rights over the continental 
shelf, described as “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources”.
67
  These rights are exclusive to the coastal state,
68
 and are inherent in the sense that 
they do not depend on occupation or any express proclamation.
69
  This latter point was affirmed 
by the ICJ in the North Sea judgment – the Court noted that coastal state rights over the 
continental shelf “exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land […] 
In short, there is here an inherent right.  In order to exercise it, no special legal process has to 
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be gone through, nor have any special legal acts to be performed”.
70
  An important 
consequence of the inherent character of continental shelf rights is that they exist wherever the 
basis of entitlement is present, and do not depend in any legal sense on the establishment of 
outer limits.
71
 Lastly, the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not affect the 
legal status of the superjacent waters (or airspace).
72
  These above features of the continental 
shelf regime are held to be part of customary international law,
73
 and there does not appear to 
be any dispute on the matter. 
3.4 Basis and extent of entitlement to the continental shelf 
 
The substantive rights identified above may be exercised by a coastal state where it has 
legal title over the continental shelf.  In the most general sense, entitlement to the continental 
shelf, as with other coastal state maritime zones, is based on the sovereignty of the coastal state 
over land territory.
74
  The conceptual link between a coastal state’s sovereignty to the land 
territory and sovereign rights over the continental shelf has evolved throughout the legal 
development of the continental shelf, being expressed at various stages through rather abstract 
terms such as adjacency, contiguity, and appurtenance.  These notions were given a more 
concrete expression in 1969, when the ICJ in the North Sea judgment recognized the natural 
prolongation of the land territory of a coastal state into and under the sea as the fundamental 
principle conferring ipso jure title to the continental shelf.
75
  The Court noted that “the 
institution of the continental shelf has arisen from a physical fact; and the link between this fact 
and the law, without which that institution would never have existed, remains an important 
element for the application of its legal régime”.
76
  The judgment also considered that, at the 
time of the 1958 Convention, Articles 1 to 3 of that convention reflected, or crystallized, 
“received or at least emergent rules of customary international law relative to the continental 
shelf, amongst them the question of the seaward extent of the shelf”.
77
  This observation of the 
Court, read today, begs the question of what the seaward extent of the shelf permitted under the 
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1958 Convention actually was, and further, how this may have been modified or superseded by 
the development of customary law on the matter.  
The first point to be recognized, with respect to Article 1 of the 1958 Convention, is that 
the exploitability criterion reflected a failure to agree on permanent outer limits.  The question 
was deferred.
78
  This did not necessarily open the door to unrestrained seaward creep by coastal 
states, as is sometimes suggested.  The formulation of Article 1 indicates that the exploitability 
criterion is only applicable to submarine areas “adjacent to the coast”.  The phrase “… admits 
of exploitation” is therefore not the only term in Article 1 which can be read as limiting the 
seaward extent of rights, as the word “adjacent” carries a legally significant meaning.  France, 
for example, in a declaration attached to its ratification of the 1958 Convention, stated its view 
that “the expression ‘adjacent’ areas implies a notion of geophysical, geological and 
geographical dependence which ipso facto rules out an unlimited extension of the continental 
shelf.”
79
  According to Oxman, custom and practice at the time of the 1958 Convention’s 
drafting supported, at most, “jurisdiction over the resources of the geological shelf and other 
coastal ‘shallow water’ seabed areas”.
80
  Based on a review of the travaux préparatoires, 
Oxman suggests that these areas would not have included the continental slope (which is 
seaward of the shelf but landward of the rise).
81
 
The Soviet Continental Shelf Decree of 1968 referred to the “continuous mass of the 
continental shelf”, which lends support to an interpretation of the 1958 Convention which 
understands legal limits arising from geophysical facts.
82
  In 1969 the ICJ introduced the 
concept of natural prolongation, which arguably modified or even replaced adjacency as the 
basis of continental shelf entitlement.  The Court did not address the extent of this entitlement 
in any direct terms, but the North Sea judgment seems to equate the legal continental shelf with 
the geophysical continental shelf.
83
  It is debatable what the extent of continental shelf rights 
would have been under customary law at the beginning of UNCLOS III, in 1974.  At a 
minimum, it seems there is support for the assertion that customary law at this time recognized 
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entitlement over the geophysical continental shelf, including where it existed beyond 200 nm.  
At the same time, Oude Elferink doubts that the legal continental shelf extended to the outer 
edge of the continental margin (including the slope and the rise) before negotiations on Article 
76 had begun, as was argued by the broad-margin states.
84
  This is consistent with the view 
expressed by Tommy Koh, in the authoritative role as president of the UNCLOS III 
conference: “[Article 76] contains new law in that it expands the concept of the continental 
shelf to include the continental slope and the continental rise.”
85
  Nevertheless, the legal 
continental shelf did extend well beyond 200 nm in certain parts of the world
86
 – places where 
existing entitlement to the continental shelf would have been severed by the proposed 200 nm 
limit. 
In any case, it is likely that customary law continued to evolve over the course of 
UNCLOS III negotiations and during the years prior to the Convention’s entry into force.  
Writing in the late 1970s, O’Connell noted a growing number of states which were adopting in 
their national legislation a definition of the continental shelf as natural prolongation to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nm from the baselines, in accordance 
with UNCLOS III negotiating texts.
87
  This new definition of the continental shelf, featured in 
the Draft Caracas Convention, represented the position in customary international law at this 
time according to O’Connell.
88
  In the 1985 Libya/Malta judgment, the ICJ recognized – on the 
basis of customary international law, as the LOSC had not yet entered into force – the dual 
nature of continental shelf entitlement featuring a distance criterion within 200 nm and the 
natural prolongation of a coastal state beyond this limit.
89
 
Today, the definition of the continental shelf in Article 76(1) appears to be fully 
recognized as reflecting customary law.  The ICJ explicitly accepted it as such in the 2012 
Nicaragua v. Colombia judgment.
90
  Judge Mensah, serving as an ad-hoc judge in that case, 
observed in a separate declaration that “It can plausibly be argued that the entitlement of a 
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coastal State beyond 200 nautical miles arises ipso facto and ab initio under customary 
international law, whether or not the State is party to [the LOSC]”.
91
  Based on the evidence 
presented above, it seems that the same perspective could have been plausibly argued in 1969, 
if not 1958 (depending on the physical characteristics of the seabed).  The question of whether 
customary entitlement extends beyond 200 nm is not at issue.  The more incisive question is 
whether the legal continental shelf under customary law extends to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, including the slope and the rise.  The answer, it would seem, depends on 
the extent to which “natural prolongation” has been modified or replaced by the concept of the 
continental margin as the basis of continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm.  On this issue, 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (hereinafter ITLOS) has noted that the notions 
of natural prolongation and continental margin are closely interrelated in the context of Article 
76 – they refer to the same area.
92
  The Tribunal proceeded to consider that natural 
prolongation can no longer be understood as a separate and independent basis of entitlement, 
and that entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm should thus be determined by 
reference to the outer edge of the continental margin.
93
  By this reasoning, if Article 76(1) is 
recognized as reflecting customary international law – which seems to be the case – this would 
squarely indicate recognition of coastal state entitlement to the edge of the continental margin, 
including the slope and the rise. 
While Article 76(1) can therefore be understood as reflecting the current state of 
customary international law, the question remains at what point in time this recognition 
occurred.  A more detailed analysis of state practice would be required to determine whether 
coastal states had acquired customary rights to the outer edge of the continental margin prior to 
1982, as asserted by O’Connell.  It has been noted that at the beginning of UNCLOS III 
negotiations, the legal continental shelf almost certainly did not consist of the entire continental 
margin.  Nevertheless, the 200 nm/natural prolongation to the outer edge of the continental 
margin definition of the continental shelf appeared relatively early in conference proceedings, 
in the 1975 Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT), and remained stable through subsequent 
revisions.  By the time the Convention was adopted in 1982, this definition of the continental 
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shelf was reflected in the legislation of at least 18 coastal states.
94
  On the other hand, 
widespread support for this definition at UNCLOS III seemed to rely on the willingness of 
broad-margin states to share a percentage of revenues derived from the exploitation of mineral 
resources between the 200 nm limit and the outer edge of the continental margin.  The idea of 
sharing revenues from seabed exploitation within national jurisdiction predated the conference, 
having been raised in different forms by the US and Canada in the context of the Seabed 
Committee, which acted as a preparatory body for the conference between the years 1970 and 
1973.
95
  The concept was revived, in the form of Article 69 of the ISNT, as a compromise 
designed to appease those states which favored a fixed 200 nm limit.
96
  Even if customary 
recognition of coastal state rights to the outer edge of the continental margin had crystallized 
before the Convention’s adoption in 1982, it seems difficult to assert that this would have 
occurred independently from the revenue-sharing obligations included as part of the package 
deal. 
3.5 Delineating outer limits beyond 200 nm 
 
The last major component of the LOSC continental shelf regime concerns the 
delineation of outer limits beyond 200 nm.  The real achievement in LOSC Article 76, it can be 
argued, is that there is a definable limit to the legal continental shelf which may be claimed by 
a coastal state.
97
  Regardless of how Article 1 of the 1958 Convention is to be interpreted, the 
fact remains that the exploitability criterion was imprecise and, as such, outer limits were 
potentially elastic.  Article 76 of the LOSC was clearly intended to address this issue, as the 
majority of its provisions are concerned with the delineation of outer limits beyond 200 nm.  
Article 76(8) on the submission of information to the CLCS will be discussed in the next 
chapter and is excluded from consideration here; the present section refers primarily to the 
criteria and methods for locating the outer edge of the continental margin contained in 
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paragraphs 4 to 7 of Article 76.  The most obvious example of state practice in applying these 
provisions is probably the large number of submissions which have been made to the CLCS by 
coastal states since 2001.
98
  Because all of these submissions came from states parties to the 
Convention, however, the customary implications of this practice are limited.  Further analysis 
of state practice in detail is needed to make an informed conclusion on the customary status of 
these provisions.  Such an analysis requires information which is not readily available and is 
not possible within the limitations of this thesis, but it seems that two general perspectives on 
the matter are possible. 
The first view sees the prospective assimilation of these rules into the body of 
customary international law as problematic due to their highly detailed and technical character.  
It can be argued that, as criteria and methods, these provisions are not capable of having a 
norm-creating character.
99
  Additionally, the implementation of the Article 76 formula is linked 
by its negotiating history to the establishment of the CLCS pursuant to Article 76(8) and Annex 
II to the Convention, as well as revenue-sharing obligations under Article 82.  These latter 
provisions were integral to the compromise reached at UCNLOS III, conditioned the 
acceptance of Article 76 in its present form, and arguably can only be implemented on the basis 
of conventional law.
100
  Tommy Koh remarked in 1982 that the provisions of the newly signed 
Convention “form an integral package […] it is not possible for a state to pick what it likes and 
disregard what it doesn’t like.”
101
  Koh specifically asserted that, in his view, a state not party 
to the Convention could not invoke the benefits of Article 76 as customary law, as the article 
contained new law and was part of a compromise involving Article 82.
102
   
On the other hand, it can be argued that these criteria and methods represent the 
practical application of a more general rule: natural prolongation of land territory to the edge of 
the continental margin.  While the definition of the continental shelf in Article 76(1) may have 
resembled new law in 1982, it is has since been recognized as forming part of customary law.  
Consequently, paragraphs 4 to 7 of Article 76 arguably have legal significance via their 
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contextual relationship to the outer edge of the continental margin, referred to in 76(1).  
According to the VCLT, terms used in treaties are to be interpreted in good faith, in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning of the term in its context, and in light of the treaty’s object and 
purpose.
103
  The purpose of Article 76 is to define the continental shelf with reference to 
precise outer limits, which are located at the outer edge of the continental margin where it 
exists beyond 200 nm.  The outer edge of the continental margin, as a legal term, has no precise 
meaning in Article 76(1) in isolation from the context provided by subsequent paragraphs.  
Specifically, the outer edge of the continental margin is to be located according to the rules in 
paragraphs 4 to 6, and delineated by the method contained in 76(7).  Article 76(2), by providing 
that the continental shelf shall not extend beyond the limits provided in paragraphs 4 to 6, 
strengthens the link between these paragraphs and 76(1).  This link is introduced before the 
spatial scope of the continental margin is defined in a general sense, in Article 76(3).  A good 
faith interpretation of Article 76(1), as a customary rule of international law, should therefore 
refer to paragraphs 4 to 7 for a correct understanding of the outer edge of the continental 
margin.   
In any case, it does not appear that there is any barrier to a LOSC non-party coastal state 
applying the Article 76 formula voluntarily.  If outer limits are delineated in accordance with 
paragraphs 4 to 7 of Article 76, it seems reasonable to assume they will also be in accordance 
with Article 76(1) and therefore with customary international law.  Customary law recognizes 
coastal state rights to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm as long as the basis of entitlement is 
present.  The appropriate rules for delineating such an entitlement are contained in the 
substantive provisions of Article 76, including paragraphs 4 to 6.  Referring to these same 
provisions, Oude Elferink notes that they “are widely accepted by the international community 
at large, no state seems to have persistently objected to them and there does not seem to be 
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4 The process of establishing outer limits beyond 200 nm 
 
A key feature of the LOSC continental shelf regime is not only that outer limits are 
precisely defined, but that, once established, they become permanent.  McDorman suggests that 
the exact location of the outer limits, pursuant to the Article 76 criteria, is arguably less 
important than the political feature of the limits being “final and binding”.
105
  This alludes to an 
important procedural role for the CLCS in the process of establishing outer limits of the 
continental shelf by a coastal state.  States parties to the Convention are obligated to submit 
information on their continental shelf limits beyond 200 nm to the CLCS, and outer limits 
established on the basis of CLCS recommendations are recognized as “final and binding”.
106
  
 While there is evidence to suggest that several of the provisions of Article 76 have 
come to reflect customary rules for determining the outer limits of the continental shelf, it is 
more difficult to extend customary international law status to the institutional role of the CLCS 
in the process of establishing outer limits.
107
  Nevertheless, an analysis of the Commission’s 
competence vis-à-vis that of coastal states in the process of establishing outer limits of the 
continental shelf yields important insights for the position of states which are not party to the 
Convention.  The sections below discuss the procedure by which a coastal state establishes 
outer limits of the continental shelf under the Convention, the nature of the Commission’s 
engagement in this process, and the legal character of established outer limits. 
4.1 Role and competence of the CLCS 
 
While a detailed analysis of the role and competence of the CLCS is beyond the scope 
of this thesis,
108
 a few basic observations can be made which are relevant to the present 
discussion.  As noted previously, the mandate of the Commission is to fulfill two main 
functions.  The first is to consider data submitted by a coastal state and make recommendations 
on the location of outer limits, and the second is to aid coastal states in the preparation of a 
                                                          
105
 McDorman (2002), p. 308. 
106
 LOSC Article 76(8). 
107
 McDorman (2002), p. 303. 
108
 For a more in depth discussion of this topic see e.g. ILA Committee on Legal Issues of the OCS (2004), Berlin 
Report, section 3; ILA Committee on Legal Issues of the OCS (2006), Conclusion No. 9. 
28 
 
submission if this assistance is requested.
109
  The Commission is composed of 21 experts in the 
fields of geology, geophysics or hydrography,
110
 which indicates that its work is primarily 
concerned with the assessment of scientific and technical data.
111
  On the other hand, it has 
been observed that "one of the cardinal functions of the Commission must necessarily be to 
interpret or apply the relevant provisions of the Convention – an essentially legal task”.
112
  The 
ILA Committee on Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf notes that the CLCS must be 
presumed to be competent to interpret or apply certain LOSC provisions to the extent this is 
necessary to carry out the functions which have been explicitly assigned to it.
113
  For some 




Commission members must be nationals of states parties to the Convention, with their 
expenses defrayed by the nominating state, but they are to serve in their personal capacities.
115
  
The CLCS might thus be described as an autonomous body, comprised of individual technical 
specialists.
116
  As such, it does not speak for or represent the interests of individual states, states 
parties to the Convention, or the international community.
117
  Nor does it have any relationship 
with the ISA, whose scope of regulatory control is directly affected by outer limits of the 
continental shelf.  While the CLCS is clearly intended to be an independent body, it has been 
noted that “the financial relationship between the nominating state and the Commission 
member creates perceptual problems that undermine the impartiality of the Commission”.
118
 
The CLCS is occasionally portrayed as having a watchdog, or safeguard, role to prevent 
coastal states from making exaggerated continental shelf claims.
119
  This should not be read as 
overstating the Commission’s mandate, however, which is limited to providing 
recommendations which it has no competence to enforce.  Only the coastal state has the 
                                                          
109
 Annex II to the LOSC, Article 3. 
110
 Annex II to the LOSC, Article 2(1). 
111
 ILA Committee on Legal Issues of the OCS (2004), section 3.2. 
112
 Nelson (2002), p. 1238. 
113
 ILA Committee on Legal Issues of the OCS (2006), Conclusion No. 9. 
114
 Eg. Nelson (2002), p. 1238, including references in footnote 9. 
115
 Annex II to the LOSC, Article 2. 
116




 Ibid, p. 312. 
119
 See e.g. Franckx (2010), “The International Seabed Authority and the Common Heritage of Mankind: The Need 
For States to Establish the Outer Limits of their Continental Shelf”, p. 559, including references in footnote 96. 
29 
 
competence to determine the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm; the CLCS 
does not have the legal authority to impose certain limits on the coastal state.
120
  McDorman 
characterizes the role of the CLCS firstly as “procedural”, in that it receives data which states 
parties are obligated to submit with respect to continental shelf limits beyond 200 nm, and 
secondly as “informational”, referring to its task to consider the data and make 
recommendations in accordance with Article 76.
121
  While the competence of the Commission 
itself is fairly limited, its recommendations are likely to influence the perceived legitimacy of 
outer limits established by a coastal state.  In this sense, the role of the Commission might be 
better described as that of a “legitimator”.
122
   
4.2 Outer limits established on the basis of CLCS recommendations 
 
 The last sentence of Article 76(8) encapsulates the significance of CLCS 
recommendations in the process of establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf by a 
coastal state.  This sentence reads: “The limits of the shelf established by a coastal state on the 
basis of [CLCS] recommendations shall be final and binding.”  The most straightforward 
reading of this provision resembles an if/then clause: if outer limits are established “on the 
basis” of the Commission recommendations, then the outer limits are “final and binding”.
123
  
An interpretation of this provision must therefore be informed by an analysis of the terms “on 
the basis of” and “final and binding”. 
4.2.1 Meaning of “on the basis of” 
 
The drafting history of the Convention reveals that the phrase “on the basis of” replaced 
the words “taking into account”, indicating that the newer formulation was intended to place a 
more concrete limitation on the freedom of action of a coastal state.
124
  Furthermore, Article 8 
of Annex II to the Convention provides that “In the case of disagreement by the coastal State 
with the recommendations of the Commission, the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, 
make a revised or new submission to the Commission.”  This opens the door to a back-and-
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forth process of submission, recommendations, resubmission, recommendations, etc. which in 
theory could continue indefinitely.
125
   
Nevertheless, it bears repeating that it is the coastal state, not the CLCS, which 
determines the outer limit of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  The requirements of Article 
76(8) can be understood as a “procedural guarantee” to assure that the coastal state establishes 
its outer limits in accordance with Article 76.
126
  This follows from the fact that CLCS 
recommendations are also required to be in accordance with Article 76.
127
  The Commission’s 
recommendations therefore resemble the middle element in a transitive relationship; if a coastal 
state establishes its outer limits on the basis of CLCS recommendations, then these outer limits 
will necessarily be in accordance with the substantive requirements of Article 76 (as long as the 
CLCS has acted within its competence). After fulfilling its mandate to “consider the data” and 
“make recommendations”, the CLCS has no further role entrusted to it by the Convention if the 
coastal state does not make a new or revised submission.
128
  Importantly, this means that the 
CLCS itself is not competent to assess whether a coastal state has established the outer limits of 
the continental shelf on the basis of its recommendations.
129
 
4.2.2 Meaning of “final and binding” 
 
 If outer limits of the continental shelf have been established on the basis of CLCS 
recommendations, Article 76(8) stipulates that such limits shall be final and binding. “Final and 
binding” is sometimes interpreted as meaning that such limits cannot be contested.
130
  This 
would suggest that with the imprimatur of the Commission’s recommendations, a coastal 
state’s outer limits suddenly become ironclad and immune to protest – at least with respect to 
other states parties.  Closer examination indicates that this view is not correct, as it both 
overstates the competence of the Commission and ignores the independence of action retained 
by individual states.  Article 76 also provides the important caveat that its provisions are 
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without prejudice to the question of delimitation of maritime boundaries between states with 
opposite or adjacent coasts.
131
 
The unique procedural role of the CLCS notwithstanding, the establishment of outer 
limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm does not appear to be fundamentally different 
from other forms of maritime boundary-making.  It is essentially a political act, which can 
result in either protest or acquiescence on the part of other states.
132
  The CLCS does not 
embody any explicitly delegated authority which deprives states of their independence of action 
and reaction.
133
  Moreover, the implicit competence of the CLCS to apply and interpret Article 
76 in making its recommendations does not replace the competence of states parties to interpret 
the Convention.
134
  It is also important to recall the observation made above: the CLCS is not 
competent to assess whether or not outer limits have been established on the basis of its 
recommendations.  It merely fulfills an informational role, in the sense that it makes its 
recommendations available to the submitting state, to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations,
135
 and to other states.
136
  Other states can use this information to assess whether the 
outer limits were established on the basis of the Commission’s recommendations (and therefore 
in conformity with Article 76), and they may react or protest accordingly.  Outer limits of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm may be successfully challenged if the coastal state has not 
acted on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, or if the Commission, in making 
its recommendations, has not acted within its competence.
137
 
At the moment of their establishment, therefore, outer limits are final and binding on the 
coastal state itself which cannot then revisit these limits (except in the event they are 
successfully challenged).
138
  Only once the threat of legal challenge has passed, signifying 
acquiescence on the part of other states parties, do the outer limits truly become final and 
binding on these other states.
139
  In the Bangladesh/Myanmar judgment, ITLOS recognized that 
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while the establishment of the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm “is a unilateral act, 
the opposability with regard to other States […] depends upon satisfaction of the requirements 
specified in article 76, in particular compliance by the coastal state with the obligation to 
submit to the Commission information on the limits”.
140
  This observation of the Tribunal is 
consistent with the position taken previously by the ILA Committee on Legal Issues of the 
Outer Continental Shelf: “if the outer limits of the continental shelf have been established in 
accordance with the substantive and procedural requirements of article 76 they will be final and 
binding on the coastal State concerned and other States Parties to the Convention.”
141
  This 
interpretation does not directly mention the issues of accordance with CLCS recommendations 
or the acquiescence of other states parties (these are discussed in the report), but it affirms the 
underlying importance of conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of Article 76 as 
the decisive factor for assuring both of these outcomes.  If the substantive rules are complied 
with, the CLCS would have no basis for making incongruous recommendations; if the 
procedural rules are followed, this information, including a summary of the Commission’s 
recommendations, will be made available to other states with the effect of precluding any 
successful protest. 
4.3 Outer limits established outside of the CLCS procedure 
 
 The final step in the establishment of outer limits of the continental shelf is described in 
Article 76(9), and involves the deposit by the coastal state of charts and relevant information 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, “permanently describing the outer limits of 
its continental shelf.”  Interestingly, this paragraph does not require that the outer limits 
deposited to the Secretary-General have been established on the basis of CLCS 
recommendations, or even considered by the Commission pursuant to Article 76(8).
142
  
Acceptance by the Secretary-General does not entail any review or evaluation of the 
information received, and there are no legal consequences attached to such acceptance.
143
  In 
consideration of the above, the ILA Committee on Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf 
found that the term “permanently” does not necessarily mean that the outer limits of the 
continental shelf submitted pursuant to Article 76(9) become fixed by the mere fact that the 
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coastal state has deposited the information.
144
  It does imply that the coastal state cannot 
subsequently change these outer limit lines, unless they are successfully challenged.
145
  After 
due publicity is given to these limits, and no protest or objection is registered following a 




 This appears to present the possibility that a coastal state might bypass the CLCS and 
still manage to establish outer limits of the continental shelf which are binding on other states.  
It should be recalled that coastal states parties to the Convention have, in any case, a procedural 
obligation to submit information on the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 nm to 
the CLCS.  This obligation is set out in Article 76(8) and confirmed in Articles 4 and 7 of 
Annex II to the Convention.  Nevertheless, there is no explicit obligation in the Convention for 
coastal states to follow the recommendations of the Commission in establishing their outer 
limits.  Article 76(8) merely provides that outer limits established on the basis of CLCS 
recommendations shall be final and binding.  As discussed above, the acquiescence or protest 
of other states is ultimately what determines the eventual legal status of established outer limit 
lines.  The reaction of other states can be presumed to depend on their perception of the outer 
limits’ conformity with Article 76 rules, and this perception is aided by the informational role 
of the CLCS and its recommendations.   
 With this in mind, four scenarios are proposed for discussion.  It is possible to imagine a 
coastal state party to the Convention which attempts to permanently establish the outer limits of 
its continental shelf pursuant to 76(9), if the outer limits (1) have not been submitted to the 
CLCS for consideration; (2) have been submitted to the CLCS but in an incomplete or partial 
manner; (3) have been submitted in full to the CLCS but are in violation of the substantive 
requirements of Article 76; (4) have been submitted in full to the CLCS and are in conformity 
with the substantive requirements of Article 76.  In the first scenario, the coastal state would be 
in clear violation of its procedural obligation to submit information and this would likely be 
protested by other states.  As regards the second scenario, it appears that Article 7 of Annex II 
to the Convention would prevent a coastal state from establishing outer limits on the basis of 
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information which has not been considered by the CLCS.
147
  The third scenario would very 
likely result in successful challenge from other states, especially with the role of the CLCS 
engaged.  The fourth scenario does not present any problems, except perhaps in the case of a 
coastal state which wishes to permanently establish its outer limits beyond 200 nm prior to 
receiving the Commission’s recommendations.  In this case the coastal state may decide to 
establish provisional limits, which, in the absence of protests, may become binding on other 
states.
148
  To date, only four states have deposited permanent outer limits pursuant to 76(9), 
signifying completion of the delineation of their continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
149
  All of 
these deposits were made by states parties to the Convention, followed the receipt of CLCS 
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5 Can a LOSC non-party make a submission to the CLCS? 
 
In light of the preceding chapter, the question can be asked how a LOSC non-party is to 
proceed in the establishment of its continental shelf limits beyond 200 nm.  It has been noted 
that the institutional and procedural character of the rules regulating the role of the CLCS likely 
prevent them from acquiring the status of customary international law.
150
  Accordingly, it is 
generally recognized that LOSC non-parties are not under any obligation to submit information 
to the Commission.
151
  At the same time, it is not clear whether these states have the right to 
make such a submission voluntarily.  The answer to the question is not simple, and the 
arguments are largely theoretical since no such submission from a non-party has occurred in 
practice.  The Commission actually sought clarification on the issue of whether it should accept 
a submission from a state which was not a party to the Convention at the Eighth Meeting of the 
States Parties in 1998.  At that time, the opinion prevailed that the Meeting of the States Parties 
did not have the competence to give a legal opinion, and that the Commission should request 
the Legal Counsel of the United Nations for an opinion only when the problem actually 
arises.
152
  The question therefore remains open to debate.  The first section of this chapter 
discusses some of the normative arguments for whether or not the CLCS should accept and 
consider submissions from all coastal states or only from states parties to the Convention.  The 
second section considers the question from a legal perspective, with regard to the VCLT rules 
on treaties providing rights or obligations for third states.  Finally, the implications of a 
hypothetical US submission to the CLCS are considered. 
5.1 Normative arguments 
5.1.1 Package deal character of the Convention 
 
 The arguments for whether or not a LOSC non-party can make a submission to the 
CLCS are animated by two opposing normative viewpoints.  The first perspective tends to note 
that the LOSC was negotiated as a package deal.  States may not choose the provisions they 
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like and disregard what they do not like.
153
  Specifically, the provisions of Article 76 were 
negotiated as part of a compromise which also includes revenue-sharing obligations under 
Article 82, giving recognition to the concern for protecting the common heritage of mankind 
principle.  These articles together constitute the compromise reached at UNCLOS III between 
the broad-margin states and those states wishing to limit the continental shelf to 200 nm.
154
  
While there may be sufficient evidence today that coastal states can exercise jurisdiction over 
the continental margin beyond 200 nm on the basis of customary international law, it does not 
follow that non-parties have the obligation or the right to access the Convention’s procedural 
rules for establishing outer limits.  On the contrary, Article 76(8) and Article 82 arguably can 
only be implemented on the basis of conventional law.
155
  Because of the perceived legal 
advantages of establishing outer limits on the basis of CLCS recommendations, the right to 
make a submission to the CLCS is held as an important incentive for acceding to the 
Convention. 
5.1.2 International imperative to define the Area 
 
On the other hand, there are commentators who assert that the CLCS can and should 
consider submissions from coastal states not party to the Convention.
156
  This perspective 
recalls that one of the key mandates of the UNCLOS III conference was to arrive at defined 
limits for the Area, so as to develop the common heritage of mankind principle.  The Area is 
defined as “the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction”.
157
  This is a negative definition – in order to define the Area, it is first necessary 
that coastal states define the limits of their national jurisdiction.
158
  In parts of the world where 
coastal states have continental margins extending beyond 200 nm, this means that the exact 
extent of the Area will not be known until the coastal state establishes the outer limits of its 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  Zinchenko suggests that the engagement of non-parties in 
the CLCS procedure should be welcomed, as it contributes to the stability of global boundaries 
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and gives effect to the general duty to cooperate with regard to shared resources.
159
  Thinking 
along the same lines, Treves finds that a submission to the CLCS from a non-party state would 
be in the interests of the international community, probably even more so than of the coastal 
state itself.
160
  While the submitting non-party would stand to gain more legal certainty over its 
outer limits, it would also be in the position of making a submission to a body whose members 
it cannot elect.
161
     
5.2 Legal arguments 
5.2.1 VCLT on rights and obligations arising for third states 
 
As an exception to the general rule of pacta tertiis, the VCLT provides for conditions 
whereby rights and obligations under a treaty may become binding upon third states.  VCLT 
Article 35 provides that “an obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the 
parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation.”  
According to Article 36, “a right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the 
parties to the treaty intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a 
group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto.”  A third 
state’s assent to the right is assumed unless the contrary is indicated, but it must expressly 
accept an obligation in writing.
162
 
There is not a clear indication from the LOSC states parties, in the text of the 
Convention or otherwise, whether or not they intended the CLCS procedure to apply as either a 
right or an obligation for third states.  It seems that the consideration of this issue at the 
Meeting of the States Parties in 1998 would have been an opportunity to make such an 
indication.  The prevailing view at this meeting was that the Meeting of the States Parties 
lacked the competence to consider the question, but perhaps this is because it was framed as an 
issue relating to the competence of the CLCS.  In light of VCLT articles 35 and 36, however, 
the issue certainly can be understood as a question of a treaty right or obligation arising for 
third states, which is decided first and foremost by the intent of the parties to the treaty.  In this 
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regard, it can be argued that the Meeting of the States Parties is precisely the appropriate forum 
for resolving this type of legal question.
163 
5.2.2 Interpretation of “coastal State” in its context 
 
As there is no explicit indication of whether LOSC parties intended for non-parties to 
have the right (or obligation) to make a submission to the CLCS, the intent of the parties must 
be inferred indirectly by analyzing the treaty provisions in their context.  Article 76(8), which 
describes CLCS engagement in the process of establishing outer limits of the continental shelf, 
uses the term “coastal State”.  The use of this term, instead of the more restrictive “State Party”, 
at least permits consideration of the idea that non-parties are not excluded from submitting 
information to the CLCS.  This yields the possibility that this term was intended to accord a 
right to a “group of States” (those with a coastline) in the meaning of VCLT Article 36.  At 
closer inspection, it is apparent that the term “coastal State” is used quite liberally not only in 
Article 76, but throughout the Convention.  In contrast, “State Party” is used relatively 
sparingly and confined mostly to Part XI governing the Area.  Clingan seizes on this distinction 
to assert that, in contrast to “other institutional provisions of the treaty” (referring to Part XI), 
the “change in terminology [in provisions relating to the CLCS] was deliberate”.
164
   
Clingan’s argument is undercut quite seriously in the context of Article 4 of Annex II to 
the Convention, which prescribes a time limit for coastal states to submit information to the 
CLCS on the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  This article provides: 
Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with Article 76, the outer limits of its 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the 
Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any 
case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State. 
 
While clearly referring to the same “coastal State” as Article 76(8), this provision indicates that 
the time frame for making a submission is linked to the entry into force of the Convention for 
the submitting state.
165
  This suggests that Article 76(8) was not intended to create a right or 
obligation for states not party to the Convention.  This interpretation is also supported by the 
relationship between Articles 76 and 82.  Because Article 82 has not created an obligation for 
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third states, it is unlikely that Article 76(8) intended to accord a right without also imposing the 
concomitant revenue-sharing obligations.
166
   
5.3 Envisioning a US submission to the CLCS 
 
 A review of the VCLT rules indicates that Article 76(8) and the CLCS procedure cannot 
impose an obligation on a third state unless the states parties intended it to do so, and the 
obligation is expressly accepted by the third state in writing.  Such an acceptance has not been 
forthcoming from the US or any other state not party to the Convention.  The CLCS procedure 
could potentially apply to third states as a right.  This possibility cannot be dismissed outright, 
as there is no provision in the Convention expressly prohibiting it and the intent of the states 
parties has not been definitively expressed.  Nevertheless, a contextual interpretation of the 
term “coastal state” as it appears in Article 76(8) indicates that it is unlikely the CLCS 
procedure was intended to apply either as a right or an obligation for third states.  This is not 
the end of the matter, though, as the question has not been resolved in practice.  A LOSC non-
party such as the US could decide to force the issue by making a submission to the CLCS, 
which in turn might refer the matter to the Legal Counsel of the United Nations.  It is also 
possible that the question would be reconsidered in the context of a future Meeting of the States 
Parties. 
 In reality, this issue has practical implications for the outer limits of only a small 
handful of states, as nearly all coastal states with broad continental margins have already 
ratified the Convention.
167
  In terms of the actual continental margin areas affected, the vast 
majority would pertain to the US continental shelf.  A 2002 study prepared by the Center for 
Coastal and Ocean Mapping/Joint Hydrographic Center at the University of New Hampshire 
found that the US may have continental margins extending beyond 200 nm in numerous 
regions, including in the Atlantic Ocean along most of the US east coast, the Gulf of Mexico, 
the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the areas around Guam and Palmyra Atoll in the Pacific 
Ocean.
168
  Put differently, the delineation of US continental shelf limits will contribute to 
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defining the Area in several regions of the world.  Seen in this context, it is not so far-fetched to 
envision a US submission to the CLCS being received favorably. 
 If it were to be determined that a LOSC non-party does have the right to make a CLCS 
submission – at a future Meeting of the States Parties, for example – this could very well be 
linked to an acceptance of revenue-sharing obligations under Article 82.
169
  VCLT Article 
36(2) establishes that a treaty right accorded to third states shall by exercised by them in 
compliance with “conditions for its exercise provided for in the treaty or established in 
conformity with the treaty.”  This can be read as suggesting a duty to comply with concomitant 
obligations.  In any case, acceptance of Article 82 obligations would seem to be demanded by 
the general principle of good faith.  Although there is not an explicit link between Articles 76 
and 82 provided in the text of the Convention, authoritative accounts of the UNCLOS III 
negotiating history confirm the close relationship between these provisions.
170
  In short, broad-
margin states – including the US – agreed to the conditions of Article 82 as a quid pro quo for 
the recognition of continental shelf rights to the edge of the continental margin.  The role of the 
CLCS in the establishment of outer limits beyond 200 nm was an integral part of this 
compromise.  US acceptance of revenue-sharing obligations could be formalized by the signing 
of an Article 82 agreement, a model version of which is currently under consideration by the 
ISA.
171
  It is interesting to note that, despite being a non-party to the Convention, the US was 
probably the first state to alert its offshore industry about the possibility of royalty payments 
arising in connection with Article 82.
172
  The US Government has described Article 82 
revenue-sharing obligations as “modest”, and as part of a package which “on balance, […] 
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6 Conclusions: Implications for the U.S. continental shelf 
6.1 Review of applicable customary law 
 
 This thesis set out to examine the legal implications of US non-accession to the LOSC 
for its entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  As a non-party to the Convention, the 
US is only bound to those provisions which now reflect customary rules of international law or 
have otherwise created rights and obligations for third states.  The analysis in chapter 3 
indicates that many aspects of the LOSC continental shelf regime are indeed applicable to the 
US through the operation of customary international law.  This includes the principal 
substantive rights of a coastal state, which were first codified in the 1958 Convention and 
carried over directly to the LOSC.
174
  It also includes the definition of the legal continental 
shelf in Article 76(1), which recognizes continental shelf entitlement extending throughout the 
natural prolongation of a coastal state’s land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, or to a distance of 200 nm if the continental margin does not reach this distance.
175
  It 
has not been possible to conclude with any certainty whether paragraphs 4 to 7 of Article 76, 
which prescribe criteria and methods for locating the outer edge of the continental margin, can 
be said to reflect customary rules.  For its part, the US has indicated that it will delineate its 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm in accordance with these provisions, and moreover that this 
follows from a legal obligation as it views Article 76(2) as reflecting international law.  If outer 
limits are delineated in accordance with paragraphs 4 to 7 of Article 76, it seems reasonable to 
assume they will also be in accordance with Article 76(1) and therefore with customary 
international law. 
6.2 Exercise of rights beyond 200 nm in the absence of outer limits 
 
Considering these findings, it is apparent that a coastal state’s substantive continental 
shelf rights and underlying entitlement are more clearly defined in customary international law 
than the outer limits which circumscribe them.  The question might therefore be asked if the US 
can exercise sovereign rights over its continental shelf beyond 200 nm before it has established 
outer limits in these areas.  This invites reexamination of two of the research questions 
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identified at the outset of this thesis: 1) is the US entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm 
under customary international law; and 2) what is the legal relationship between entitlement to 
a continental shelf and establishment of its outer limits?   
The first question was already addressed above, and it has been concluded that the US is 
indeed entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm under customary international law where 
its continental margin extends beyond this distance.
176
  Moreover, it is well documented in 
legal scholarship that the rights of a coastal state over its continental shelf, including in areas 
beyond 200 nm, exist wherever the basis of entitlement is present and do not depend on the 
establishment of outer limits.
177
  This point was also recognized by the Meeting of the States 
Parties in connection with decisions to defer the CLCS submission deadline contained in 
Article 4 of Annex II to the Convention.
178
  This follows from the inherent character of 
continental shelf rights, in that they do not depend on any express proclamation
179
 or the 
performance of any special legal process or act.
180
  The distinction between entitlement to the 
continental shelf and the establishment of outer limits was recognized implicitly by the ICJ in 
Tunisia/Libya (1982),
181
 and explicitly confirmed by ITLOS in Bangladesh/Myanmar 
(2012).
182
  Because the US is entitled to sovereign rights over its continental shelf beyond 200 
nm on the basis of customary international law, the exercise of these rights is not legally 
dependent on the establishment of outer limits, via the CLCS procedure or otherwise. 
At the same time, it is true that the establishment of outer limits is necessary to 
determine the exact extent of a coastal state’s entitlement over its continental shelf.  Part of the 
continental margin may extend beyond the outer limits resulting from an application of LOSC 
Articles 76(4) to 76(7), and the incorporation of such areas into the legal continental shelf is 
prohibited by the separate rule contained in 76(2)
183
 which the US accepts as international law.  
It has been suggested that a coastal state’s inherent right to a continental shelf in the absence of 
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established outer limits “does not remove from the coastal State the burden of demonstrating its 
entitlement” to a continental shelf area beyond 200 nm.
184
  The absence of outer limit lines 
beyond 200 nm presents uncertainty over the exact extent of legal entitlement, which can result 
in attendant difficulties for a coastal state seeking to exercise continental shelf rights in areas 
near to potential outer limits.
185
  
6.3 Options for establishing outer limits beyond 200 nm 
 
 As discussed at length in the previous chapter, it is uncertain whether the US as a non-
party to the Convention has the right to make a submission to the CLCS.  If the US is unable or 
unwilling to submit information to the Commission, it might alternatively seek to unilaterally 
establish outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm by depositing charts and relevant 
information with the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be given due publicity.  In this 
scenario, the acquiescence of other states would likely depend, in part, on the public disclosure 
of all scientific data needed to substantiate the outer limits being established.  The US 
Government is apparently not averse to sharing this type of information, as all of the research 
data gathered in connection with the US Extended Continental Shelf Project are already 
publically available.
186
  At the same time, other states might still register their protest to outer 
limits established in this manner if they feel that the LOSC package deal has been violated.  If 
such limits do gain the acquiescence of other states, they may eventually become permanent.
187
 
There are compelling arguments for why a third state should be able to make a 
submission to the CLCS, not least of which is that this would contribute to defining the limits 
of the Area.  This in turn is needed to give effect to the common heritage of mankind principle, 
thereby serving to advance the original and overriding mandate of UCNLOS III.  The US may 
be hesitant to force the issue by simply attempting a submission, as there is a concrete 
possibility it would be rejected.  It might be desirable from the US perspective to broach the 
question with more diplomatic finesse, perhaps involving an acceptance of the revenue-sharing 
obligations under Article 82 of the Convention.  Meanwhile, there are indications that 
Venezuela – another non-party to the Convention – may be preparing to make its own 
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submission to the CLCS.
188
  How the question of third states’ participation in the CLCS 
procedure will be resolved remains to be seen, but it seems possible that this will occur sooner 
rather than later.  
6.4 Final remarks: revisiting the package deal 
 
This thesis has found that, on the basis of customary international law, the US enjoys 
the same substantive rights and entitlement to its continental shelf as other broad-margin states 
which have acceded to the LOSC.  The rules the US must follow in establishing the outer limits 
of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm are far less certain, however.  Both the substantive rules 
(Article 76 formula) and procedural rules (CLCS submission process) for the establishment of 
outer limits beyond 200 nm are ambiguous in their legal implications for third states.  These 
were among the innovative continental shelf provisions negotiated at UNCLOS III, and indeed 
represent two major components of the compromise achieved on outer limits.  The third part of 
this compromise entails Article 82 revenue-sharing obligations.  These three components of the 
LOSC continental shelf regime were adopted together as a package deal.  
In addition, it is clear that the definition of the continental shelf as reflected in Article 
76(1) was negotiated as part of the same package deal.  Unlike the substantive rights which had 
been previously codified in the 1958 Convention, coastal state entitlement over the entire 
continental margin did not have a solid basis in customary international law prior to UNCLOS 
III.  This is not to say that there was no customary basis for continental shelf entitlement 
extending beyond 200 nm.
189
  Rather, the recognition of broad-margin states’ rights to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, including the slope and the rise, was negotiated as part of the 
compromise adopted in 1982.  Specifically, this was conditioned on acceptance of concomitant 
revenue-sharing obligations set out in Article 82.  As such, the definition of the continental 
shelf contained in Article 76(1) – which is now part of customary international law – is 
arguably linked to these revenue-sharing obligations as a consequence of the package deal 
character of the Convention.  The nature of this link has not been fully explored in this thesis, 
and the extent of its legal implications remains uncertain.  This represents an interesting area 
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for further research, and would necessarily involve a closer analysis of the limited state practice 
which exists in relation to Article 82.  
State party or not, the US has made clear that it intends to demonstrate the extent of its 
continental shelf entitlement in accordance with the Convention’s provisions.  This being the 
case, the relationship between the provisions of Article 76 and Article 82 cannot be ignored.  
The general principle of good faith would seem to demand respect for the LOSC package deal 
– rights which are derived from this compromise should not be separated from their 
corresponding obligations.
190
  Among the three principal elements of the LOSC continental 
shelf regime analyzed in this thesis – substantive rights of a coastal state, entitlement over the 
continental margin, and the delineation of outer limits – it appears that the substantive rights are 
the only element which can be interpreted under customary international law as truly 
independent from the package deal sealed in 1982.  For the US to achieve legal certainty over 
the full extent of its continental shelf rights under international law, the most reliable course of 
action would be to ratify the Convention.  If the advice and consent of the US Senate remains 
unattainable, some legal uncertainty is bound to persist in relation to the extent of US 
entitlement over the continental margin and the rules by which the outer limits of this 
entitlement are to be delineated and established – particularly if the US does not accept and 
implement revenue-sharing obligations reflected in Article 82.  
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